

# TTP Update Responses To Date

What U S or Allied Tactic Technique or Procedure TTP should we modify or abandon in your area of expertise	Duty Position at SAG U
Towed Artillery	Fire Support Specialist
we should modify emplacing and march order	J34 AMD Nighttime Operator
The U.S. and Allied forces should reconsider reliance on static, centralized air defense architectures. Fixed-site TTPs are increasingly vulnerable to precision strikes and drone swarms. To mitigate this, we should shift toward mobile, distributed, and layered defense networks that integrate C-UAS, electronic warfare, and cyber resilience to ensure survivability and effectiveness in contested environments.	Air and Missile Defense (AMD) Systems Integrator
Not applicable.	Personnel Specialist
EW Reprogramming enterprise as a whole (Joint, but also within each service) needs to be reviewed and modified to ensure reprogramming in a tactically relevant timeline occurs.	SOK EW Advisor
Having a Surface Warfare Officer managing a battle space that isn't relevant to ship driving.	Night Chief of Operations (CHOPS)
N/A	EW NCOIC



ATP 3-09.30 "Observed Fires" , ATP 3-09.42 "FIRE SUPPORT FOR THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM" Both need to include the UAS capability for observation and strike. This addition would be beneficial in all "3-09" references for Field Artillery overall	CFT East- Luhansk UAS/OPS/Fires Lead
No comment.	J-1 Adjutant
Same as above.	J35 FUOPs Planner
I think we should place a bigger emphasis on Squad and lower movements, because of the widespread use of drones and to have a smaller footprint in movements.	Dynamic Fires NCOIC
Less emphasis on the bureaucratic arguing for who has better training. lets get together, create solid training plans and stick to it. lets stop cancelling things last minute when things changed 10 times in one month because staff officers kept arguing amongst each other on who has a better idea.	TMO Operator
How we clear trenches and breaches. We make the idea too clean when reality it is messy the same with BD 6. I believe we can't make everything a exact science.  I believe if its possible that we should request a platoon or a company of UKR and put them against our own. We have TPP's on how we think the Russian's might act from 20 years ago. UKR has the playbook of how the Russian's fight now.	Targeting NCO
I believe everything in place is working sufficiently	Forward Observer/ TMO Operator
Operational Area Occupation / Firing from Operational Areas	SAG-U Master Gunner
NA	ORSA



	Director, Joint Capabilities Acquisition Cell
Make it easier for FVEY personnel to integrate w/ the SAG-U team.	J25
The US needs to invest in building more electrical infrastructure, and developing a plan to protect existing infrastructure. While this falls largely outside the scope of the military, it is something we have discussed with DOE and they have incorporated into their own lessons learned.	Civil Affairs Planner
I believe we should improve accountability practices for personnel travelling between Wiesbaden and Krakow. Need some accountability for travel between Wiesbaden and Kyiv (and the entire route in between).	J-1 Adjutant
We are extremely behind in drone technology as we limit ourselves to company supplied drones. There is no room for modularity in current US UAS drones. Modularity: replace Chinese chips with UKR chips (safer / more secure)	CFT-East Fires Lead
<p>Administrative: To ensure mission success at SAG-U, supporting units must provide their most proficient, expert-level personnel who can operate autonomously and with minimal reach-back. Based on current operational demands, if any service member assigned to SAG-U cannot independently resolve an RFI and must rely on an external counterpart for expertise, then we require two of that service member's equivalent to be assigned to SAG-U to ensure adequate coverage and prevent operational delays.</p> <p>Operational: Observations of Ukrainian combat operations reveal a significant divergence from U.S. Army movement doctrine. Ukrainian forces employ minimal and deliberate movement on the battlefield as a primary survivability measure against constant, lethal enemy surveillance. This stands in stark contrast to the U.S. Army's core TTP of "fire and maneuver." This adaptation to a hyper-lethal, transparent battlefield warrants a critical examination of our own doctrine to ensure its validity in future conflicts.</p>	J33 CJOC NCOIC



<p>? I feel like the US is behind in the EW space. A lot of equipment that US has (Army) is old / outdated. Still training on CREW systems. Start training on what we would be using instead of old stuff. E.g., the TEWs system (manpack). Not sure what Ukraine is using – they won't share information. Russia is using POL 21, SAT Jammer jamming engagement, drone jammers. Partner sharing is going to be important . .we can share with the Ukrainians, but they do not share with us.</p>	EW NCO
<p>Establish clearly defined goals and Commander's Intent and ensure the strategic messaging supports both the intent and the goals. Without clear and defined goals for the mission and clear Commander's Intent it is virtually impossible to have consistent messaging. Our Command General has made his intent as clear as the situation allowed, but conflicting messages and messaging that result from unclear or undefined mission goals permeate SAG-U.</p> <p>Example: Are we helping Ukraine "Win" the fight, or are we helping them survive and stabilize the FLOT/FLET to work towards a peace agreement? These are, in many ways, conflicting goals and conflicting intents. The tactical component of operations to achieve each are very similar, but the strategic messaging surrounding these and the intent behind them is vastly different in the messaging component.</p>	PAO
<p>For a mission that is more than 3 years old there is entirely too much chaos and upheaval. Yes, I understand that the mission is dynamic but that doesn't mean the whole thing needs to be chaos. Example: fiasco with LSAs. Poor planning, poor communication, poor decision making.</p>	Corpsman
<p>The next fight will be Joint and Combined. Classifications are paralyzing. The US has to quickly solve an CDS to ensure the ability to create a COP that facilitates the CJOC. The struggles with Delta were unique to the partner not being a NATO partner, however, information sharing with FVEY partners was sometimes difficult.</p>	CFT Lead
<p>How we share information across formations, nations, allies</p>	Air Intel Officer
<p>I believe they can improve on having more information on what SAG-U is/ does for lessons learned, before coming here I had no idea what SAG-U was or what it represented. Her and her leadership did not know what SAG-U. Figure out a way to send a read-ahead packet to Soldiers arriving.</p>	JVB SEL
<p>The acquisitions process is too slow, and too expensive compared to what is available for some of our adversaries that spend less.</p>	UAS OPS FIRES



<p>Intel sharing with the partners. We can't give them everything (rules) and they don't give us everything (trust). Classifications were confusing and limiting our ability to share.</p>	<p>Partner Coordination Cell NCOIC</p>
<p>CUI- Defense Industrial Base energization / decoupling from the top 5 military industrial complex, rapid innovation hubs, rapid acquisitions processes at the speed of relevance, and battlefield testing. (CUI) Operation Spiderweb should have instigated a DAF wide working group to mitigate that type of threat in the homeland. Additionally, there should be a joint agency task force mission at the federal level to identify and neutralize similar targeting cycles in the homeland.</p>	<p>Aide</p>
<p>Gaining trust between partners for information sharing and reporting. They didn't trust us easily so sometimes they were not open or get as much information as needed.</p>	<p>Intel Analyst</p>
<p>-Rapidly develop UAS technology and integrate into in support of maneuver.</p>	<p>CFT Director</p>
<p>-We should not centralize the approval process up to general level commands. We should leave that to the field and ship commanders who have a better understanding of the situation and can coordinate with on the ground elements more efficiently. This slows things down and the speed of the battlefield is much faster and larger scale. -We have a lot of talkers and not enough doers. Too many "chiefs, not enough Indians".</p>	<p>Dynamic Fires NCOIC</p>
<p>Our speed of information dissemination. The amount of time it takes to FDO information or form it into a way that classification requirements are met is not necessary and takes unneeded time away from the execution of a mission be it high priority or not. Average 3 hours wait time. FDO clearance should take minutes.</p>	<p>TMO Dynamic Fires</p>
<p>Have a better way of tracking and providing better information about the equipment they send out such as documentation, packing list, something to better out tracking clarity.  Use of manual process (Form 302). . .slow and room for inaccuracy / delays. Lot of the material orders could not be confirmed, items were missing, or there were items shipped we didn't know. Tracking item inventory and better communication for logistics.</p>	<p>Data Program Manager</p>



Acquisitions process; policies take too long. To get money to production to delivery. Things are obsolete by 90 days. We do not have production scale for production speed and capacity.	Engineer S&T
The decision to close the RDC-U, without proper planning of how we can still provide all the support and capabilities, was a big misstep. Poor planning. We need FSRs and proper C2 / leadership in charge. The current support being provided for parts at Baumholder is unacceptable. They are causing delays in the Ukrainians ability to disseminate parts to their units forward. Ukrainians are being sent wrong parts, mixed pallets destined for multiple locations (Ukrainians spending lot of time breaking down pallets, leading to 10-15 day delays on delivery of parts to the front line user).	Maint NCOIC
- Procurement - Organizational change - Talent management: Merit based promotion = speed.	CAG
- Tunnel Vision (overly focused on their stovepipe / lane) - Prioritizing Inefficient Briefing - Communication (CFTs didn't seem to have constant dialogue and maybe didn't understand everything the intel team was handling. In some cases, the CFTs did not have intel person. Also seemed all of in the info handed, e.g. in chat, was not being used or viewed.	0241 Tactical Imagery Analyst (Geo)
The US military has always struggled with underutilizing and mismanaging talent. If a person arrives here at SAG-U on the JMD under a J3 billet, but the billet was not coded properly, and you have an intelligence officer that could be used in the J2 shop, we as a military have wasted an asset. The right people need to be in the right places that can leverage the right talents.	Senior Mission Manager
-The US obviously is holding back due to many reasons like our current outlook on America first, the China threat in the pacific, boarder issues and so on. Russia is a legitimate threat which is worth the US's attention. The US in my opinion needs to just maintain it current commitments. No more no less. The men ive worked with over the last six months with the AFU and good men and I believe they are honorable and are fighting for a just cause.	Ammo Log Chief
JCIDS – getting rid of it. It was slow and does not mirror how war is operating today.	JCAC



The mindset of security and safeguarding US information. Understand there is a need to share information and support our partners. However, there is hardly any concern about the level of risk when proper security protocols are not followed.	SSO
Find ways to share info / intel easier across channels (Faster)	Intelligence
N/A	Fusion Cel
Incorporating more enlisted service members with proper MOS/Rate to fill a specific function.	Collection Manager
We should adequately supply AFU munitions request in order for Ukraine to feasibly sustain itself this winter. Delayed and partially filled materiel orders lower morale and foments distrust between the US military and AFU.	CFT East Ops
Big Navy is not involved to the extent it should be. US Mil limitations to helping the partner and learn are mostly self-imposed. Manning to job specialties seems to be an issue.	J2 Advisor
The Ukrainians are quick to respond to changes in the battlefield. They quickly change TTPs and employment of drones and weapons. The US military is very regimented. I don't believe that we would be as quick. Virtually every weapon and tactic needs to be approved or in accordance with instruction before use. The Ukrainians don't have this limitation. This relates to my earlier point that in order for experimentation to be systemically be successful, people need the opportunity to experiment without failure being equivalent to a career-ending mistake.	Deputy J3
Sourcing of members to fill positions. Members are filling positions outside of their specialty codes	Intel Analyst



<p>We should definitely keep working on the interoperability issue between the 2 organizations.</p>	<p>J639 - Interoperability</p>
<p>Reduce the reliance on Baseball Cards. Text reports and tear lines answer the mail in a fraction of the time, particularly in winter.</p>	<p>NGA Hybrid Analyst J22 JISE DST</p>
	<p>Strength Manager J1 SEL</p>
	<p>Foreign Disclosure Officer</p>
<p>Modification of the JMD to allocate more personnel to assist with Mayor Cell functions</p>	<p>Mayor Cell COR</p>
<p>None. You should adopt the drive to coordinate with parallel organizations/Directorates.</p> <p>It is important, even vital sometimes, that each section focus on their section in order to accomplish their tasks. But knowing where you can assist, or where someone else can assist you, is also vital. Coordination.</p>	<p>J2X HUMINT Operations Cell, Operations Officer</p>
<p>Modify: MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR TACTICAL CONVOY OPERATIONS ATP 4-01.45; MCRP 3-40F.7; NTTP 4-01.6; AFTTP 3-2.58 Lessons learned from this conflict should greatly modify how the U.S. plans for ground movement near and to the FLOT and likely in the rear area.</p>	<p>J4 Maintenance Officer</p>
<p>N/A</p>	<p>J8 DEPUTY</p>

